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THE GROWING CRISIS IN
THE STRATEGIC AND CRITICAL MINERALS
OF THE UNITED STATES
James Santini*
INTRODUCTION
The power, prosperity and progress of the United States has been made
possible largely through the use of its rich endowment of mineral resources.
The vigorous development and prodigious use of nonfuel minerals such as lead,
zinc, iron ores, and copper' were essential in the development of the United
States as an industrial leader. Although the country continues to possess a
vast wealth of many such resources, 2 domestic development of these minerals
has been severely curtailed in recent years. This decline in domestic development
of nonfuel mineral resources threatens both the economic welfare and national
security of this country. 3 Various national commissions,4 academic founda-
tions,5 and private research groups6 have warned us for twenty-five years to
be aware of over-dependence on foreign mineral suppliers, of government
policies and regulations that defeat domestic development and frustrate industry
competitiveness, and of the consequences of insufficient research and development.
*Member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Nevada); Chairman, House Subcommittee of Mines and
Mining of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs; Member, House Interstate and Foreign
Commerce Committee. B.S. University of Nevada, 1959; J.D. Hastings College of Law, 1962.
I would like to thank Judith A. McMorrow, Raymond Carey and Charles D. Oliver, students of Notre
Dame Law School, for their assistance in the preparation of this article.
I. Comptroller General, Report to Congress, "The U.S. Mining and Mineral Processing Industry: An
Analysis of Trends and Implications," 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 1-16 (1979) [hereinafter cited as -
Comptroller General's Oct. 1979 Report].
2. "Essentially, mineral richness is a function of land area. As would be expected of a geographically
large country, the United States ranks first in reserves of copper, cadmium, lead, molybdenum and
silver, and ranks high in many others." Id. at I.
3. "With respect to the [nlation's long-range position, we believe that the United States has cause for
deep concern. It is our considered opinion that unless an urgent effort to upgrade minerals and mining
techology is launched soon, we face the possibility that the growth in our standard of living will Ibe
limited due to mineral resource constraints within 20 to 30 years," House Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs, Establishing a National Minerals Policy, S. Rep. No. 390, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 9
(1969) (statement by Walter J. Hickel, Sec. of the Interior). See also, Comptroller General's Oct.
1979 Report, supra note 1, at 57-67. See generally, "Strategic Metals, Critical Choices," Time, Jan,
21, 1980, at 64; "Our Growing Dependence On Others for Key Resources," U.S. News, Nov. 12,
1979, at 74; "Fidgets Over A Metals Policy," Bus. Wk., May 7, 1979, at 130; "Fear Soviet Supercartel
for Critical Minerals." Purchasing, Nov. 8, 1978, at 42; "Now the Squeeze on Metals," Bus. Wk.,
Jul. 2, 1979, at 46; "The Defense Production Gap: Why the U.S. Can't Rearm Fast," Bus. Wk., Feb.
4, 1980, at 80; "The World Wide Business Report Governing Non-Fuel Minerals," Minerals Wk.,
Dec. 14, 1979, at 17; "Soviet Squeeze On Strategic Minerals," Datamation, Oct. 1978, at 147; "The
Geopolitics of Nonenergy Minerals," Air Force, June 1979, at 76.
4. National Commission on Material Policy, Material Needs and the Environment, Today and To-
morrow (June, 1973); National Commission on Supplies and Shortages. Government and the Nation's
Resources. (December, 1976).
5. See COMRATE, "Mineral Resources and the Environment," National Academy of Sciences, 1075,
for an analysis of the complex interdependence between energy, mineral production, environmental
concerns, and the need to reconcile the interests of government, industry and the consumer.
6. See, e.g., "Technology, Material Substitution, Recycling and Conservation," Hearings before the Sub-
comm, on Mines and Mining of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979) (statement of David Swan, American Mining Congress); [hereinafter cited as Mines and
Mining Hearings 1.
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In the face of this threat, Washington has remained virtually unconcerned.
Although the government gives the strongest possible support to numerous
national priorities such as public health, human rights, the environment and,
all too late, energy, it gives no priority to fostering domestic hardrock or
nonfuel mineral development. 7 The United States purports to have a mineral
policy, but neither a workable scheme of implementation nor a serious
commitment to make the policy work has been made by our country.
The purpose of this article is to increase the nation's awareness of the
mineral problems and urge Congress to make a serious commitment towards
development of the nation's mineral resources.
LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTION
In 1970, the United States Congress established a broad national minerals
policy8 designed to assure the nation the benefits derived from an economically
sound and stable domestic mining and minerals industry. The Mining and
Mineral Policy Act of 1970 implicity found that the long-range outlook for
an adequate supply of minerals for the United States is a cause for con-
cern,9 and further recognized that the future well-being and national security
of the country is directly tied to the supply and availability of minerals.10 The
Act established a continuing national policy to foster and encourage private
enterprise in the development of an economically sound and stable domestic
7. "Government policies now serve more as a controlling factor in determining size, location, and timing
of future mineral investments. As a result, investment in the minerals industries . . . is only about
one-fifth of what it should be to meet future demand." Mines and Mining Hearings, supra note 6
(1979) (statement of Robert A. Kilmarx).
8. 30 U.S.C.§21(a) (1976). The Act reads:
The Congress declares that it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government in the
national interest to foster and encourage private enterprise in (1) the development of economically
sound and stable domestic mining, minerals, metal and mineral reclamation- industries, (2) the
orderly and economic development of domestic mineral resources, reserves, and reclamation of
metals and minerals to help assure satisfaction of industrial, security and environmental needs,(3) mining, mineral and metallurgical research, including the use and recycling of scrap to
promote the wise and efficient use of our natural and reclaimable mineral resources, and (4)
the study and development of methods for the disposal, control, and reclamation of mineral
waste products, and the reclamation of mined land, so as to lessen any adverse impact of
mineral extraction and processing upon the physical environment that may result from mining
or mineral activities.
For the purpose of this section "minerals" shall include all minerals and mineral fuels
including oil, gas, coal, oil shale and uranium.
It shall be the responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior to carry out this policy when
exercising his authority under such programs as may be authorized by law other than this
section. For this purpose the Secretary of the Interior shall include in his annual report to the
Congress a report on the state of the domestic mining, minerals, and mineral reclamation
industries, including a statement of the trend in utilization and depletion of these resources,
together with such recommendations for legislative programs as may be necessary to implement
the policy of this section.
9. See 119701 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin. News, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5792.
10. Id. at 5793. See also. Letter from Walter J. Hickel to Cong. Jackson (July 9, 1969), reprinted in Sen.
Reo. 390, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 9.
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mining industry and to encourage the orderly and economical development of
domestic mineral resources. It further delegated to the Secretary of the Interior
the responsibility to carry out this policy. 11 The Mining and Mineral Policy
Act was to be the first step in the attainment of reasonable self-sufficiency
through use of our domestic resources. 12 The United States, however, has failed
over the last ten years to implement the policy statement contained in the
Mining and Mineral Policy Act. In an effort to stimulate a comprehensive
government-sponsored review of the factors hampering domestic nonfuel mineral
development and in order to encourage compliance with the 1970 Act, twenty-five
members of Congress met with President Carter in mid-1977. The group
informed the President of the long term consequences of the difficulties
encountered by the domestic minerals industries. In response to the data, which
indicated a sharp increase in the United States' dependence on foreign nonfuel
mineral supplies and a corresponding vulnerability on the part of the United
States, the President ordered a comprehensive cabinet-level nonfuel mineral
policy review (NMPR). 13 The NMPR was intended to present an analysis of
the main problem areas confronting the domestic minerals industry and to
propose adequate solutions. The review was to be led by fourteen government
departments and agencies of the twenty whose authorities and responsibilities
directly or indirectly affect the health of the mineral industry and its ability
to produce.
The NMPR was to have been completed within fifteen months of its
creation, but the problem analysis was only completed in August, 1979. This
draft report consisted solely of the Department of the Interior's delineation of
issues involved in only a few of the identified problem areas. 14 Unfortunately,
even the NMPR draft release was found to be grossly inadequate by
representatives from such diverse sources as the environmental community, the
mining industry, public interest groups, and members of Congress. The report
failed to delineate factors which have created a financially weakened minerals
industry. Moreover, the report failed to comprehend the national security
problems posed by United States' increasing dependence on imports of minerals.
11. Supra note 8.
12. Supra note 10, at 5794.
13. On December 12, 1977, President Carter created the Non-Fuel Mineral Policy Coordinating Committee
to be chaired by Secretary of the Interior Cecil P. Andrus.
14. See U.S. Department of the Interior. Draft Report: "Report on Issues Identified in the Nonfuel
Mineral Policy Review," August 1979 [hereinafter cited as Draft Report). Nine problem areas were
selected with individual agencies having been assigned responsibility for investigating them and submitting
their analyses for the report:
(1) Major minerals supply problems (Minerals Review Committee);
(2) Availability of foreign minerals to the U.S. and its allies (Department of State);
(3) relationship of environmental quality, health and safety and the price and availability of minerals
(Environmental Protection Agency);
(4) the minerals resource potential of federal lands (Department of Interior);
(5) financing, capital formation, and tax policies (Department of Treasury);
(6) recycling, conservation, and substitution (Department of Commerce);
(7) competitiveness of U.S. minerals industries (Department of Interior);
(8) adequacy of minerals-related research and development (National Science Foundation); and
(9) Adequacy of existing government capabilities to support Federal policymaking (Department of
Interior).
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The NMPR release illustrates clearly that there is not yet an awareness
much less a consensus among the various government agencies and departments
as to what are the problems and issues affecting the domestic minerals industry.
Government officials specifically have failed to understand and examine the
interrelationships among the multiple problems confronting the domestic minerals
industry. This governmental myopia and the absence of coordinated department
and agency efforts to obtain insight into the problems of mining or to accept
responsibility precludes innovation and even hinders government support of
domestic mineral resource development.
An example of the absence of coordinated executive policy is the refusal
of both the Defense and State Departments to recognize the effect on national
security of declining domestic mineral production and increasing dependence
on foreign imports. 15 The Defense Department does not concern itself with
long term mineral adequacy required for the industrial machinery to support
national security; the State Department does not concern itself with long term
security of foreign mineral sources as an element of foreign policy. These
departments consistently defer their responsibility to the Department of the
Interior. Meanwhile, the Department of the Interior is not aware of the
long-range defense needs and does not consider the immediate or potential
impact upon domestic mineral demand when it takes actions such as the
designation of uses of public lands. The result of the absence of long-range
planning has been a tendency to rely upon the already inadequate national
strategic and critical minerals stockpile, 16 which was created by Congress to
supply this country with necessary resources in the event of war. 17
Although the United States has had a domestic minerals policy since 1970,
it has not had a serious commitment to make this policy work. I will proceed
to examine four specific problems: (1) the financial weakness of the minerals
industry, (2) government regulations, (3) government land withdrawals and
(4) mineral dependency and national security. These problems point out the
need for a serious national action to strengthen our domestic mineral resource
development.
15. See generally, Mines and Mining Hearings, supra note 6.
16. Created by the Strategic and Critical Materials Stock-Piling Act of 1939, 50 U.S.C. §§ 98-98h (1976).
1 7. The stockpile contains 79 mineral commodities, 34 of which at the present time do not meet quotas
deemed necessary to sustain the country in the event of a war of three years duration. Furthermore,
10 of the mineral commodities are in a form which leaves them unavailable for immediate use. See
General Services Administration, Federal Preparedness Agency, Stockpile Report to Congress: October,
1978 to March, 1979, (July, 1979). Moreover, because the mineral commodities are not routinely
tested for quality, there are mineral commodities of questionable quality being held to satisfy stockpile
goals. See, U.S. Comtroller General, Report to Congress: The Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile
will be Deficient for Many Years, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. (1978).
[Vol. 7: 63
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ARGUMENTS FOR INITIATING
AN EFFECTIVE NATIONAL MINERALS POLICY
Financial Weakness of United States Minerals Industry
Mining industries are abnormally sensitive to cyclical economic trends with
the result that mining corporations in the United States fight a constant battle
to remain economically secure in today's economy. Several factors contribute
to the financial insecurity of mining corporations. First, mining and mineral
processing is among the most capital intensive of all industries. 18 The capital
investment for a mining operation is staggering. For example, a 100,000
ton-per-year copper project today costs about 650 million dollars' 9 and a
500,000 ton-per-year aluminum project, from mine to refinery, costs about two
billion dollars.20
Inflation has contributed to the increasing capital costs of the mining
industry. The Commerce Department's 1970-1979 price index for capital goods
used in mining rose a staggering 179 percent compared to 118 percent for all
manufacturing, and only eighty percent for the gross national product price
deflator. 2 1 During the period of 1970-1976, when inflation rose at an average
rate of 6.5 percent, capital costs for new aluminum smelters rose twenty
percent per year, and mine-to-refinery copper investments rose nineteen percent
per year. 22 As a result of inflation-prone capitalization costs, there has been
a steady increase in the long term debt of mining companies. For example,
in the ten year period ending in 1977, the long-term debt of ten major United
States mining companies rose from eleven percent of total capitalization to
thirty-two percent. 2 3
Minerals development is a high-risk expensive venture from exploration
through marketing. Long lead times for development coupled with long range
cash-flow projections into a volatile international market require deliberate
decisions. The ultimate effect of these hostile economic conditions on this
highly capitalized, inflation-prone industry is reduced profits. A 1978 survey
of sixty-four industry groups found that the rate of return on net worth for
nonferrous metal manufacturing ranked fifty-fifth in profitability; nonmetal
ranked sixty-first; metal mining, the least profitable of all industry groups
surveyed, ranked sixty-fourth. 24 During 1977, the combined mining sector
reported an average return on invested capital of only 3.9 percent after
taxes. 25
18. See Falkie, Reflections on Government Policy, 12 J. Int'l Law & Econ. 163, 164 (1978); See also:
Mines and Mining Hearings, supra note 6 (Nov. 12, 1979) (statement of Edward S. Miller). Factors
which contribute to high capitalization costs include remoteness of cities, facilities and equipment,
labor, and lower quality ore requiring increased processing.
19. Draft Report, supra note 14, at 19.
20. Id.
21. Martin V. Alonzo, "The Economics and Finances of U.S. Mining: "Crisis and Remedy" AIME
Minerals Economic Symposium at George Washington University, Washington, D.C. (Nov. 14, 1979).
22. See generally, "Mineral Development in the Eighties: Prospects and Problems," British-North American
Committee, British-North American Assoc., (Nov. 1976).
23. Moody's Bond Survey, Bond Ratings and the Outlook for the Mining Industry, 1278-80 (April 24,
1978).
24. See generally, Citibank, Monthly Economic Newsletter, April, 1979.
25. Comptroller General's Oct. 1979 Report, supra note 1, at 31.
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Mining operations are characterized by long payback periods and uncertainty
as to costs; 26 mineral prices tend to fluctuate cyclically so that industries
are uncertain whether any particular operation will prove profit-
able. 27 Yet, despite all of these indications that mining operations are a
financially weak segment of American industry, the United States government
has simply compounded the problem. A recent report to the Congress by the
Comptroller General stated the difficulty:
In recent years, [however,] several U.S. Government actions have reduced the
profitability of domestic mineral projects, making investment in such projects
less attractive than they otherwise would have been. These actions and the
efforts of foreign governments to encourage development of their minerals
production have contributed to the failure of investment in domestic mineral
production to keep pace with growth in U.S. demand. Consequently, U.S.
manufacturers are having to rely more and more on foreign processed minerals
to meet their needs. 28
Thus, the mineral industry has been weakened by inflation and the costs
inherent in mining. Ironically government has not been sensitive either to the
fundamental need of this industry or the economic problems it is facing; one
particular problem has been government regulation.
Regulations
The American public is becoming increasingly sensitive to the complex
problems accompanying government regulation. The problems of the regulatory
system, which have been the target of recent congressional reform action, 29 can
be exemplified by examining the effect of government regulation on the mining
industry.
Two characteristics of government regulation stand out as the cause of
regulatory problems. First, the regulators often do not understand the regulated
industries; the mining industry is no exception to this problem. 30 Second, and
unperceived problems arise through the implementation of new untested
regulations which are narrowly designed to cure the apparent problem; these
regulations unfortunately have unanticipated side effects. This second flaw in
26. Draft Report, supra note 14, at 19.
27. See, Falkie supra note 18, at 164.
28. Comptroller General's Oct. 1979 Report, supra note 1, at 73.
29. A cursory examination of some of the legislation introduced in the House on January 15, 1979 (96th
Cong. Ist Sess.) reveals the following sampling of reform bills: H.R. 65 (To improve congressional
oversight of federal programs and activities by requiring greater specificity in setting program objectives,
budget and tax expenditures); H.R. 187 (To amend the Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA));
H.R. 372 (To amend OSHA); H.R. 400 (To reduce paperwork required by federal agencies and
increase congressionnal supervision); H.R. 403 (To establish procedures to review administrative
procedures contrary to law or congressional intent); H.R. 426 (To amend OSHA); H.R. 425 (To
repeal OSHA); H.R. 430 (To require an economic impact report whenever new environmental regulations
are promulgated or considered).
30. For an overview of the adverse affect of government regulations upon operating costs and revenues
of domestic mineral projects see, Comptroller General's Oct. 1979 Report, supra note 1, at 38. For
a critical examination of the cost ramifications of strict environmental (EPA) and worker health and
safety (OSHA) regulations upon the American mining industry see Comptroller General, Report to
Congress, "'Learning to Look Ahead: The Need for a National Materials Policy and Planning Process,"
96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), at 37 [hereinafter cited as Comptroller General's April 1979 Reportl.
[Vol. 7: 63
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the regulatory system, the failure of regulators to have a full view of the
effects of their regulations, was described by Walter Hickel, former Secretary
of the Interior:
The broad spectrum of laws lodged in numerous agencies compounds problems
in the development of constructive mineral policies. If the Nation's future
national resources requirements are to be met through the wisest conservation
and management of available resources, there is a positive need for integration
of natural resources plans and programs, a need for consistency of treatment
by the Federal Government of natural resources programs, and planning and
management for the most effective use and productivity of all natural re-
sources.
31
Partially because of the failure of the government to comprehend the
impact of government regulations, the costs of compliance with the multitude
of regulations has risen tremendously in recent years. A recent Department
of Commerce report estimates that to meet Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) regulations,
the copper industry by 1987 will spend 4.5 billion dollars and will be forced
to reduce expected 1987 production by thirty-six percent.32 The report further
found that because of regulations, the cost of U.S. copper, by 1987, will have
increased forty-three percent (1974 dollars), and 31,000 jobs that could have
been available will be lost. 33 High cost compliance with stringent environmental
regulations during the severely depressed copper market of 1975-1979 had a
heavy impact on the financial condition of our copper industry.
In some instances, the costs of federal regulations have been the decisive
factor in plant closures of profitable operations. A good example is the Monaca
plant in Monaca, Pennsylvania, owned by St. Joe Minerals. Over the past five
years St. Joe Minerals spent thirty-five million dollars to meet EPA emission
standards for sulfur dioxide and particulates. 34 Subsequently, EPA and OSHA
issued new lead standards that would have cost another twenty-five million
dollars for compliance for recovery of secondary lead. The company could not
justify the added costs in light of St. Joe's losses in zinc in 1978 and 1979
and in light of an anticipated loss of ten million dollars in 1980. 35 The plant
was closed. Its closure further decreased United States zinc metal production
from one million tons ten years ago to half that in 1979.
The highly competitive lead industry has also felt the effects of EPA and
OSHA regulations. OSHA's own estimate is that compliance will cost the lead
industry about 416 million dollars in capital expenditures and about 112 million
dollars per year in operating costs. 36 Recently, the American company that
has long been the leading recycler of scrap lead announced that it would close
31. Comptroller General's Oct. 1979 Report, supra note 1, at 69.
32. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, The Potential Impact of U.S. Regulations on the U.S. Copper Industry (April,
1979).
33. Comptroller General's Oct. 1979 Report, supra note 1, at 57.
34. Mines and Mining Hearings. supra note 6 (Nov. 28, 1979) (statement of Charles R. Carlisle, Vice
President of St. Joe Minerals Corp).
35. Id.
36. Comptroller General's Oct. 1979 Report, supra note 1, at 40.
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or sell all of its secondary lead smelters. It was apparent to the company that
the capital employed in this business could be more profitably employed in
other investments. 37 Not only is this major recycler withdrawing from the
business, but it does so when the United States has already begun to ship
substantial amounts of lead scrap outside the country. Ironically, this is
happening when it is the government's announced policy to encourage maximum
recycling. Unable to obtain EPA's reconsideration, the lead industry has taken
the matter to the courts, questioning the premise of the standards for health
protection as well as the technical and economic feasibility of compliance. 38
A further example is provided by the steel industry. There have been
recent closings of plants during the last several years. Some plants were obsolete
and no longer economical to operate, yet government policies do not encourage
modernization. Dr. John F. Elliott, Professor of Metallurgy at Massachusetts
Institute of Technology and a recognized expert in steelmaking, accurately
characterized the problem when testifying before the Mines and Mining
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs:
Like many segments of heavy industry, the American steel industry is finding
it very difficult to obtain the large amounts of capital that are required for
it to modernize. The reasons for this situation are many and varied: governmental
policies, regulatory actions, antitrust laws, taxes, rules on depreciation and
depletion allowances, tariffs and trigger prices. At this point, it is not appropriate
to reconstruct the debates over the right and wrong, fairness or unfairness of
these policies, regulations, laws, taxes, etc. It is more important to conclude
that they have had a cumulative influence on the financial strength of the
domestic steel industry and on the long-term viability of this important segment
of our domestic economy. 39
The United States' steel industry estimates that through 1985 its investments
in environmental control equipment will total 9.8 billion dollars (1978 dollars)
and its operation costs will amount to 3.6 billion dollars (1978 dollars) per
year. 40 When American industry no longer finds it as profitable to operate in
the United States as in a foreign nation, the natural result is an increase in
foreign investment. Such phenomena is beginning to occur within the mining
corporations. The aluminum industry is investing in new plant capacity outside
the United States, particularly in Australia and Brazil, largely because of our
uncertain energy policies and environmental delays in new construc-
tion. 41 Projections of the annual growth rate of United States demand for
aluminum to the year 2000 vary mostly in the six to seven percent range, but
domestic primary capacity is projected to increase only 1.4 percent. 42 One
study reports that by the year 2000, our aluminum metal imports will double,
37. Another company that processed arsenic-based materials stated that its engineering controls could at
best achieve only a 50% confidence level of compliance with federal standards; it estimated capital
costs of 35 million dollars, increased annual operating costs of over 10 million dollars and by doubling
its work force to meet employee standards, an increased labor cost of 42 million dollars a year. Id.;
See also, "Now the Squeeze on Metals," supra note 3, at 48.
38. An interesting sidelight is that in 1979 we shipped 7,000 tons of lead concentrates mined in the U.S.
to the U.S.S.R. while at the same time United States smelting capacity was available and United
States consumers were in need of lead.
39. Mines and Mining Hearings, supra note 6 (Oct. 18, 1979) (statement by John F. Elliott).
40. Arthur D. Little, Inc., Steel and the Environment: A Cost Impact Analysis, 1978 (May, 1978).
41. Comptroller General's Oct. 1979 Report, supra note 1, at 13.
42. Id., at 9.
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which, with increased ore and alumina (the intermediate product) imports, will
cost the United States over seven billion dollars (1979 dollars) annually. 43
Regulatory costs are not the sole cause of the financial difficulties of the
mining industries. Regulations, however, can be and often are the final factor
which justifies a plant closure or development of foreign resources. Unless
Congress understands the impact of government regulation on the mining
industry, there can never be an effective national nonfuel mineral policy.
Land Withdrawals
The occurrence of economic concentrations of usable nonfuel minerals is
a relatively rare natural phenomena. Between 1150 and 1200 mines supply
ninety percent of the world's mineral requirements. 44 The geologic uniqueness
of mineral deposits is even better exemplified by the rule-of-thumb that the
average mining company can stay in business if it makes but one significant
discovery every twenty to thirty years. But to make that discovery, the company
must continue searching for newer sources of minerals. We will never know
where all of our mineral deposits occur, but they will not be found unless the
country encourages the search both for new discoveries and the technology to
change nonmineable grades of minerals to mineable grades.
Given the anomalous nature of economic mineral deposits and the continuing
need for domestic supplies of nonfuel minerals, it would seem natural that the
government would encourage new exploration of mineral deposits in the United
States. Instead, however, our government has taken action which inhibits
exploration for mineable United States deposits. Most of the nation's mineral
potential exists on our public lands in the West and Alaska. These public
lands, however, have been largely excluded from mineral exploration. 45 There
has been no estimate of what mineral production has been lost from discovered
or undiscovered mineral deposits on public lands where mining was restricted
or prohibited. This percentage will increase, for the Administration has
withdrawn, recommended, or is studying the withdrawal of over 200 million
acres of federal land for wilderness or other single use purposes. About 125
million acres of this total are in Alaska. 46
This withdrawal of public lands from mineral search occurs in spite of the
recommendation of the Public Land Law Review Commission. In 1970, the
Commission warned that "mineral exploration and development should have a
preference over some or all other uses on much of the public lands."' 47
The effect of the withdrawal of public lands from exploration has been
demonstrated in the fuel minerals industry. Despite the growing power of
OPEC, removal of public lands increased from sixteen per cent of lands
43. Id.
44. Engineering and Mining Journal, 1978 EMJ International Directory of Mining and Mineral Processing
Operations (1978).
45. "Currently, the Federal Government controls more than 760 million acres (about half of it in Alaska),
or about one third of the land in the United States. While access to these lands was once
unrestricted ... about 42 percent of these lands have been completely withdrawn from mineral
activity, another 16 percent severely restricted, and 10 percent moderately restricted. These restrictions
can seriously jeopardize or delay mineral exploration and development. For example, it has been
estimated that Arizona contains 65 percent of U.S. copper reserves, but 70 percent of Arizona's land
area is federally controlled," Comptroller General's October Report, supra note 1, at 19.
46. See generally, Minerals Wk., Dec. 14, 1979, at 18.
47. "One Third of the Nation's Land," A Report to the President and the Congress by the Public Land
Law Review Commission, June 1970.
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available for oil and gas exploration in 1968 to a startling sixty-four per cent
in 1974.48 This policy of nondevelopment of our national resources is in part
the cause of our increased dependence on foreign fuel sources.
The Department of the Interior, often a proponent of more and bigger
withdrawals of public lands for the sake of preservation, has been unresponsive
to the growing trend toward complete withdrawal of public lands from
exploration. Ironically, however, the Secretary of the Interior is responsible for
the mineral management for public lands, for the health of our mining and
minerals industry and most importantly, for the adequancy of national mineral
supply.49 Of all government agencies, the Department of the Interior should
be most sensitive to the increasing needs of national minerals exploration. Our
mineral base is our land base, and how we manage our lands will largely
determine America's self-sufficiency in minerals. But our government has
remained unresponsive.
The cumulative effect of the weakness of mining industries, government
regulation, and withdrawal of many potential new sources of minerals has been
to put our country's national security in unnecessary jeopardy.
Mineral Dependence and National Security
Oil is a severe and dramatic example of resource vulnerability. Before
1973, the notion of an oil embargo was dismissed by most as an irrational
prediction. As late as 1976, some experts were still stating that the oil cartel
would not work. Unfortunately, it has worked and its success is largely
attributable to the United States' dependence on foreign fuel resources.
The domestic reliance of the United States on foreign produced minerals
varies from metal industry to metal industry but the trend of imported nonfuel
minerals is increasing, especially in processed minerals. For example, zinc metal
imports have increased eighty-nine percent between 1968 and 1977 while zinc
ore and concentrated imports have dropped seventy-seven percent. 50 The
demand for ferroalloys, used in the iron and steel industry, is expected to rise
through 1985 at an annual rate of 3.4 percent for primary chromium and
three percent for silicon alloys. 51 While the United States remains the world's
largest producer of copper, copper imports have steadily increased, from 131,000
short tons in 1969 to 457,000 short tons in 1978.52 The annual United States
growth demand for imported copper is also expected to increase at the annual
rate of 3.5 percent between 1975 and 2000.5 3 Significantly, the United States
while nearly 100 percent reliant on foreign sources for critical and strategic
chromium and manganese has largely lost its ferroalloy capacity as imports
48. Bennethum and Lee, "Is Our Account Overdrawn?" Mining Cong. Journal (Sept. 1975).
49. Establishing a National Mineral Policy. S. Rep. No. 91-390, 96th Cong. 1st Sess. 9 (1979), letter
from Walter J. Hickel states: "This legislation does not provide any new authority. We believe, however,
it is desirable to establish such a national policy and to carry it out. In establishing and carrying out
such a policy, the administration, of course, would take into account other national policies such as
those relating to the conservation of those resources and the protection of the environment and other
resource values and more importantly, the nation['s] need to improve the health and the safety of
those who are in these industries."
50. Comptroller General's Oct. 1979 Report, supra note 1, at 4-6.
51. Id. at 6-7.
52. Id. at 8.
53. Id.
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of ferrochrome and ferro-manganese increased from a twenty percent of demand
in 1970 to seventy percent in 1978. 54 Although imports fluctuate from year
to year, there is every reason to believe that the import-export gap will widen
as we continue to discourage mining of our mineral deposits and thereby
encourage mineral imports.55
The distribution of the world's hard-rock mineral deposits is diverse. The
need for hard currency in the developing countries would appear to discourage
concerted action in the form of cartels or price manipulation. There are
increasing indications, however, that a collective course of action is being taken
by developing countries.56 In addition, there is the ever-present possibility that
individual countries will act irrationally, even if against their own self-
interests. 57
While most United States' imports come from mineral-rich developed
countries such as Canada, Australia, and South Africa, there is no assurance
that these countries will not enter into marketing agreements with other
producers. Recently, Australia and Brazil, the first and second largest iron
ore producers having the second and third largest reserves in the free world,
entered into an agreement to maximize their bargaining strength in the market.
While this does not constitute a cartel, other agreements between major
producers seem likely.
In addition, it is anticipated that there will be increasing competition among
developed countries for foreign minerals, particularly on the part of Europe
54. Statement of George Watson, Ferroalloy Assoc., Oct. 23, 1979, Sdb Comm. on Natural Resources
and Environment of the House Comm. on Science and Technology, 96th Cong. 2nd Sess. (1979).
55. Comptroller General, Report to Congress, "Need to Develop A National Non-Fuel-Mineral Policy,"
93rd Cong. 1st Sess. 6-8 (1976). [hereinafter cited as Comptroller General's July 1976 Report]. See
generally, Comptroller General, Report to Congress, "The Strategic and Critical Materials Stockpile
Will Be Deficient for Many Years," 96th Cong. 1st Sess. (July 27, 1978), and Appendix I., infra.
56. For a government commentary on this issue, See, Draft Report, supra note 14, at 8-12; According
to that U.S. Department of Interior Report, the principal issue is "[That] future supplies of several
imported minerals critical to the United States and its allies are becoming less secure . . . ", Id. at
8; The report notes that South Africa is a major supplier of chromite, ferrochromium platinum group
metals, and ferromanganese. Should the U.S. supplies from South Africa become unavailable the
United States will become materially dependent upon the Soviet Union for critical chromium and the
platinum group metals. Id.; For a commentary on American industries' fears of foreign raw material
cartels, see also Mines and Mining Hearings, supra (Oct. 18, 1979) (statement of E. F. Andrews);
For a stark commentary on "The Eroding Global Security Environment, Vulnerability of Sealanes,
Lack of adequate Logistic Planning, and Dependence on Foreign Flag Ships to Carry Raw Materials,"
see statement of Robert A. Kilmarx, supra note 7; see also, Mines and Mining Hearings, supra note
6 (Oct. 13, 1979) (statement of William Schneider, Jr.) for a commentary on cartel-like organizations
and possible Soviet minerals control strategy; See generally note 3, supra.
57. In December 1974, the Nixon administration's Council on International Economic Policy reported,
"Embargoes of raw materials are highly unlikely. They do not make economic sense in terms of
producers' revenue objectives. The objective of increased revenue argues for selling at a high price
rather than denying the product altogether. An embargo, however, may be undertaken for political
reasons, as in the case of the Arab oil producers. If the politically inspired embargo is to be sustained,
the producing countries must also have economic muscle. The Arab oil producers had both political
desire and economic strength. This combination was not found in any other group of producer countries
we have examined . . . " Comptroller General's July 1976 Report, supra, note 55, at 16-17, citing,
Council on International Economic Policy, Special Report, "Critical Imported Materials," Dec. 1974;
It is noteworthy that since 1974 the world has changed dramatically. The events in Iran have proven
this to to the developing nations of the world. The prior successes of the Arab oil producing countries
and the apparent willingness of Iran to risk serious international consequences in order to stage a
dangerous political demonstration by taking hostages posits a warning the United States can not ignore.
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and Japan, who are 100 percent dependent for many of their mineral
requirements. 58 Increased competition on the part of the buyers can only solidify
the position of the producers. Like OPEC, which took eight years to achieve
its goal of market dominance, the world's mineral producer associations could
well attain the control desired.
The increasingly staunch stand of developing countries, who have threatened
to deny raw materials to industrial countries if the latter do not accept demands
that mineral processing be done by the suppliers, must be assumed to pose a
long-term economic threat. There has also been a serious trend developing for
American mining companies to shift their industrial processing operations to
locations outside the continental United States. 59 The loss of not only United
States mine capacity, but the increasing loss of United States processing
capacity, in effect prompted by increasingly complex governmental regulation,
is eroding our ability to make independent decisions. 60
The Soviet Union fully understands the implications of nationalism in the
developing countries and the economic and national security vulnerability that
comes with increased dependence on foreign mineral suppliers. The U.S.S.R.
emphasizes maximum self-sufficiency, regardless of the costs. While we import
fifty percent or more of twenty minerals, the Soviet Union is known to import
only six, just two of which approach a fifty percent import reliance.61 They
are clearly a major exporter, channeling their trade whenever possible into
hard currency markets.
An example of Soviet sophistication is apparent in southern Africa. As
Chart I indicates, south African nations are extremely important to the United
States as a source of strategic and critical minerals. In 1979, the south African
countries supplied about seventy-six percent of our cobalt (essential for jet
engines, turbines, communication, and cutting tools), about eighty percent of
our ferrochrome (least substitutable of all alloy metals for heat and corrosion
resistance and strength; essential for stainless steel), sixty percent of our
platinum group metals, and numerous other minerals in both large and small
quantities. 62 The United States is highly vulnerable in this part of the world
which is so vital that it has been called the "Persian Gulf of Minerals." The
Soviet Union is fully aware that it could assume a dominant position for
control of much of the world's markets for five of the minerals for which we
rely heavily on southern Africa. The Soviet Union and southern Africa together
account for a major share of world production, trade, and in some cases
reserves, for chrome, platinum metals, manganese, asbestos, and gold.
Soviet strength in these mineral resources provides a new insight into
Russian and Cuban involvement in southern Africa. There is little doubt that
Soviet long-range strategy is to secure increasing shares of future production
58. See, Statement of Robert A. Kilmarx, supra note 7 for an interesting analysis of the intractability
of the European countries in the face of inadequate supplies of nonfuel minerals.
59. Comptroller General's April 1979 Report, supra note 30, at 24-25. While the reasons for this trend
are complicated and involve complex economic considerations, the growing costs of health, safety and
environmental regulation are high on the list of industry complaints.
60. Id. at 24.
61. Strauss, "Mineral Self-Sufficiency: The Contrast Between the Soviet Union and the United States,"
presented at The 1979 American Mining Congress Convention, Los Angeles, Calif. (Sept. 23, 1979).
62. Draft Report, supra note 14, at 9.
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from southern Africa. There are some analysts who estimate that known Soviet
chrome and manganese deposits are dropping in grade and that exports outside
the COMECON countries could stop in 1985.63 The U.S.S.R. is already a
dominant political influence in mineral-rich Angola and in Mozambique. 64 The
ultimate political direction that Zimbabwe-Rhodesia will take remains uncertain,
but Soviet influence in the area decreases the probability of a pro-United
States government.
The East German/Cuban sponsored May 1978 incursion into Zaire's cobalt
and copper producing Shaba Province was a principal cause of the 1978
world-wide cobalt shortage.65 The Soviet Union, not surprisingly, bought much
of the world's cobalt surplus immediately prior to the invasion of Zaire.66 The
producer price of cobalt quadrupled in 1978 while the free market price erupted
with a 700 percent increase (from $6.40 to $50.00 per pound). 67 With 55-65
percent of United States' cobalt supply coming from Shaba and 75 percent
from southern Africa, 68 a disruption of this source would have devastating
effects upon our critical reliance on this metal for heat-resistant alloys in jet
engines. 69
The impact of the commodity games that Soviet and pro-Soviet nations
are playing in international mineral markets has already been felt. Last year
the Soviet Union engaged in a puzzling six month buying splurge in world
markets. Working through intermediaries, the Russians bought an estimated
three hundred million dollars worth of lead, copper, zinc, aluminum, molybdenum,
and cobalt, all of which they produce.70 Earlier, the U.S.S.R. severely limited
its exports of platinum and titanium, precipitating worldwide price in-
crease.71 At best, there is an element of unpredictability in Soviet behavior in
international mineral markets.
America's national security is at stake in the international game of mineral
trade. We must have a better, more objective attitude not only in recognizing
the need of domestic mineral development but also in the area of foreign
policy.
63. See generally, note 3, supra.
64. See "Fear Soviet Supercartel for Critical Minerals," supra note 3, at 43-44.
65. Id. at 44. The Soviet involvement in Shaba Province in Zaire, which controls 60% of global cobalt
resources, is significant because it would enable the U.S.S.R. to effectively control nearly 80 percent
of the world's cobalt resources.
66. Wash. Post, "Soviets Reportedly Bought Up, Cobalt Before Zaire Invasion," (May 24, 1978); Christian
Science Monitor, "Moscow's Maneuvering in Africa Causes Cobalt Shortage in West," (Jan. 16, 1979).
See also, "Strategic Metals, Critical Choices," supra note 3, at 64; "Fresh Fears that the Soviets
Will Cut Off Strategic Minerals," supra note 3, at 63 for general commentary on the growing
self-sufficiency of the Soviet Union in strategic minerals.
67. "Strategic Metals, Critical Choices," supra note 3, at 64.
68. Id.
69. See "The Defense Production Gap: Why the U.S. Can't Rearm Fast," supra note 3, at 80; see
also "Fear Soviet Supercartel for Critical Minerals," supra note 3.
70. See "Fear Soviet Supercartel for Critical Minerals," supra note 3, for a discussion of the prospects
developing for the formation of a supercartel controlled by the U.S.S.R. which could wield global
domination over several stategic minerals.
71. "Strategic Metals, Critical Choices," supra note 3, at 64.
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CONCLUSION
The purpose of this article was to point out four major problem areas
involved in development of our national minerals policy. First, the United
States must confront the fact that its mineral industries are financially insecure
and require government actions to increase the financial strength of the industry
as a whole. Second, our country must recognize that government regulations,
although vital, have become so burdensome as to place often insurmountable
obstacles in front of mineral development. Third, we must acknowledge
government responsibility in withdrawing potential sources of mineral supplies
from domestic production. Finally, the United States must understand that
nonfuel minerals, like fuels such as oil, have a tremendous although subtle
impact on our national security. With this recognition, the United States can
make a serious commitment to a national minerals policy.
